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Migration from Arab countries to European countries started many decades ago. It has been 
driven by a variety of push–pull factors. The two main factors are economic deterioration and 
political instability. Many young people migrated to escape unemployment, poverty and poor 
working conditions. Others fled the effects of war and conflicts. This paper reviews Arab youth 
migration to European countries, its drivers, and the way it impacts the origin countries, host 
countries and the immigrants. Despite some negative implications of migration on the origin 
countries such as education cost and deprivation of the country from the potential capacity of 
skilled people, the benefits of these countries are rather clear and include remittances, knowledge 
and experience transfer. However, mitigation of Arab youth migration challenges is not an easy 
task; it needs new governmental approaches to reduce unemployment rates, as well as the active 
involvement of youth in economic and political life.
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Az arab országokból az európai országokba történő bevándorlás évtizedekkel ezelőtt kezdődött. 
A folyamatot különböző push és pull tényezők mozgatták, a két legfontosabb azonban a gazda-
sági visszaesés és a politikai instabilitás volt. Sok fiatal azért vándorolt ki, hogy elmeneküljön 
a munkanélküliségtől, a szegénységtől és a szerény munkafeltételektől, mások a háború és a konf-
liktusok következményei elől menekültek. Ez a tanulmány az arab fiatalok európai országokba 
irányuló migrációját, mozgatórugóit és hatásait tekinti át, figyelembe veszi továbbá a szárma-
zási országokra, a befogadó országokra és a bevándorlókra gyakorolt hatásokat. A migrációnak 
a kibocsátó országokra olyan negatív következményei vannak, mint például az oktatási költségek, 
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hazautalások, illetve a visszatérők ismereteinek és tapasztalatainak beépítése a helyi gazdaságba. 
Az arab fiatalok migrációs kihívásainak enyhítése nem könnyű feladat; új kormányzati megköze-
lítésekre van szükség a munkanélküliségi ráta csökkentésének elérése érdekében, valamint szük-
séges a fiatalok aktív részvételének előmozdítása a gazdasági és politikai életben is.
Kulcsszavak:
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1. INTRODUCTION
The migration of Arab youth to Europe represents a considerable phenomenon for discussion 
and study due to its impacts and patterns diversity, as it includes both less educated and 
highly-skilled migrants. In the past, the migration of Arab youth to Europe has often 
taken the form of legal migration, but, ‘increasingly restrictive immigration regimes and 
border management in Europe, combined with high migration pressures in the Arab 
region and real labor market demands in Europe, have contributed to the rise in irregular 
migration’.1 The European Union is one of the main destinations for Arab migrants due to 
its geographical proximity, linguistic and historical ties: ‘The central Mediterranean route 
has experienced the largest and fastest-growing flows with more than  170,000 arrivals in 
Italy alone in  2014, four times the number recorded in  2013. The number of departures 
has risen since the Arab spring in  2011.’2 Migration is one of the important aspects of 
the Arab–European relationship. As a point of fact, several initiatives and platforms have 
been stated to discuss migration issues and their implications for countries of origin and 
the host countries. These initiatives include the central Mediterranean contact group, 
Euromed migration projects and many others. The aim of these initiatives and meetings 
was to formulate common policies and to coordinate efforts on migration. This paper aims 
to review and analyse the migration of Arab youth to Europe and its impact on countries 
of origin, host countries and migrants themselves. The main data sources of this article are 
previous  literature and international organisations’ reports. This article seeks to answer 
the following questions: What are the magnitudes of youth migration from Arab countries 
to European countries? What are the drivers of Youth Migration from Arab countries? 
What are the impacts of this migration on both Arab countries and the host countries? In 
essence, the article strives to address the aforementioned research questions by applying 
one main hypothesis which dictates that the migration of Arab youth is driven by specific 
push and pull factors in both the home country and the host country, and the impacts 
extend to both countries and immigrants, as well.
2. THE MAGNITUDE OF ARAB YOUTH MIGRATION TO EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES
Migration is a global phenomenon, it is not limited to a certain region or country, but it 
spans all over the world: ‘In  2013, young international migration aged  15–24 represented 
 12.2  percent (i.e. an estimated number of more than  28  million individuals) of all 
1 ESCWA and IOM, Migration, Displacement and Development in a Changing Arab Region, situation report on 
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international migrants worldwide.’3 However, emigration and displacement from Arab 
countries are well-evident. For example, ‘the number of migrants and refugees originating 
from the Arab region has grown from approximately  11.5 million in  1990 to  29 million in 
 2017, increasing by  153 percent in the  27 years’.4 It is also worth mentioning that ‘the number 
of Arab migrants was  24 million in  2015, and they account for  10% of the international 
migrants stock’.5 Notably, data show that the phenomenon of youth migration has increased 
dramatically in the last decade. A survey conducted by the Arab Center for Research and 
Policy Studies (2020) revealed that ‘22% of the respondents want to immigrate, and the 
majority of them want to do so in order to improve their economic situation. However, 
about  15% said that their motive is education, and  12% want to emigrate for political or 
security reasons’.6 In terms of the destinations of Arab youth migration, the survey carried 
out by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2016) shows that ‘the majority of 
the respondents (37%) want to migrate to Europe, while  20% prefer the Arab Gulf States, 
 12% to the USA, and  9% to Canada, however, the rest is distributed to countries such as 
Turkey, African countries, and others’.7
Along the same line, ‘immigrants from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Palestine, Tunisia, and Western Sahara) around the world are mostly concentrated in 
the EU, of which France (with  2,828,623) has the greatest share, followed by Spain and 
Italy’.8 Obviously, in addition to the other Arab countries such as the Gulf States, and some 
Asian countries like Turkey, Europe stands as another destination for Arab migrants and 
displaced persons. Accordingly, ‘over  40.4% of Arab migrants went to OECD countries, 
especially European Union countries’.9
3. DRIVERS OF ARAB YOUTH MIGRATION
A combination of push–pull factors usually leads to the decision to migrate. Historically 
speaking, the Arab youth migration has been driven by a variety of factors on top of which 
are economic reasons, violence and insecurity, and lack of human rights enforcement. 
In general, the economic situation in many Arab countries is distinguished by the fact 
that it is still suffering because of the instability and geopolitical influence in the region. 
3 ILO, Youth Employment and Migration: A review for practices from joint programs of the United Nations/ Inter-
national Labour Office, Employment policy Department, Youth Employment Program (Geneva,  2013),  36.
4 ESCWA and IOM, Situation report on international migration  2019: The global compact for safe, orderly, and 
regular migration in the context of Arab region (Beirut,  2019),  25.
5 IOM, Migration to, from and in the Middle East and North Africa (Geneva,  2016),  4.
6 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The  2019–20 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief (Doha, 
 2020),  6.
7 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Arab Indicator (Doha,  2016),  42.
8 Elena Sánchez-Montijano and Marina Girona-Raventós, ‘Arab Mediterranean Youth Migration: Who Wants to 
Leave, and Why?’ EuroMesco Policy Brief  73 (2017),  3.
9 League of Arab States, Regional Report about Arab International Migration, International Migration and 
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One of the main challenges facing many Arab countries is the steady increase in public 
debt whereby ‘the total public debt of Arab countries increased from USD  665.9 billion in 
 2017 to about USD  707.8 billion in  2018’.10 This debt constitutes a burden on many Arab 
countries and impedes development trends, which makes migration an inevitable decision 
for Arab youth. The considerably high unemployment rate is another important indicator 
of the economic situation in Arab countries. The inability of the labour market to absorb 
the growing numbers of graduates is one of the main push factors in Arab countries. 
As for unemployment, it is one of the highest in the world, especially in countries such 
as Palestine, Syria and Yemen. The average rate of unemployment in Arab countries was 
‘10.0% in  2018, almost double the world average, disproportionately affects young people, 
at  25 percent’.11 It is also interesting to mention that the Arab youth were the most affected 
by the bad economic situation in the Arab countries. Furthermore, the economic condition 
is the major reason that led Arab experts and highly educated individuals to leave their 
homeland especially when they find themselves receiving an income lower than those who 
are not educated or who do not have the same level of education. Despite some fluctuation 
in the unemployment rate in the Middle East and North Africa from year to year, there 
was ‘a significant increase in the unemployment rate among youth after  2011’,12 because 
of political and social crises in the Arab countries. The relationship between the increase 
in the unemployment rate and political instability is well clear. In Syria for example, ‘the 
unemployment rates increased from almost  15 percent in  2011, prior to the civil war, to 
 57.7 by the end of  2014’.13 Regarding the effect of the Arab spring on migration among 
youth, some studies argued that ‘the uprisings in countries like Tunisia and Egypt fuelled 
irregular emigration to the EU. Some European countries recorded an increase in Tunisian, 
Egyptian and Moroccan immigrants in the  2010–2013 periods, noticeably Italy’.14
Although, economic factors are considered the most important driving force of migration, 
‘the decision to migrate also may be driven more by broader career concerns such as the 
quality of opportunities to conduct research, to gain experience, upgrade qualifications, 
safer  environment, as well as a  lifestyle’,15 than by how much more individuals could 
earn abroad. While among highly skilled people, ‘salary discrepancies and differences in 
working conditions make the greatest difference’.16 Corruption, and nepotism which are 
common survival strategies in Arab countries, negatively influence all areas of life. ‘One of 
10 Arab Monetary Fund, The Joint Arab Economic Report: Overview and Statistical Annexes (Arab Monetary 
Fund, Economic Department,  2019),  12.
11 United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development Report: Leaving No One Behind (New York: 
United Nations,  2019),  23.
12 ILO, Global Employment Trends: Preventing a deeper jobs crisis (Geneva,  2012),  93.
13 UNDP and RBAS, Arab Human Development Report: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in 
a Changing Reality (New York: United Nations,  2016),  139.
14 Sánchez-Montijano and Girona-Raventós, ‘Arab Mediterranean Youth Migration’,  4.
15 Michael Clemens, Skill Flow: A  Fundamental Reconsideration of Skilled-worker Mobility and Development 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development,  2009),  12.
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the imbalances in developing societies is the prevalence of mismanagement, favoritism, not 
putting the right person in the right place, and incompatibility of income with production.’17 
However, the weakness of the legislative and judicial authorities compared to the executive 
authority is one of the main causes of corruption in the Arab region. According to the 
Corruption Perception Index (2019), ‘the rates of all Arab countries were below  50, except 
for the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman’.18 Moreover, ‘human 
rights in most of the Arab countries is a major challenge, particularly the right of highly 
educated people in making their decisions and exercising their general freedoms’19 as many 
highly educated individuals fled not because they could not find a job, but because they 
did not wish to live in such a socio-political environment. On the other hand, developed 
countries can provide migrants with better opportunities for work and scientific research 
in addition to another main pull factor of migration: better individual well-being and 
social security services in receiving countries compared to Arab countries. Conflicts and 
political instability is another factor that drives Arab youth migration. Indeed, many Arab 
countries are still suffering from the continuity of political conflicts. In Syria, Lybia and 
Yemen, for example, there is no political solution looming so far. Furthermore, Palestine is 
still a country under occupation, wherein the violation of human rights has been apparently 
due to the Israeli restrictions. Undoubtedly, occupation measures are a major factor that 
encourages the youth to migrate to avoid such an unfavorable socio-political environment.
However, it is equally important to mention that there is a  relationship between 
geographical location and colonial relations between sending countries and receiving 
countries. According to the gravity model, migrants’ flows to host countries are affected by 
a set of variables including natural and artificial factors. ‘Natural factors include distance, 
transport, information, and psychic costs. Whilst, artificial factors include government 
limitations on freedom of travel and population movements.’20 Thus gravity model relies on 
data on origin–destination migration flow, demographic factors, population and distance. 
Therefore, the volume of migration between any two interacting centres is the function of 
two main factors, the distance between them and the population size. Indeed, this model 
explains to some extent the migration of Arab youth to Europe, and how the demographic 
factor and the geographical dimension affect the patterns and trends of this migration. 
To conclude, in general terms, push–pull factors can include a wide range of circumstances 
at internal and external levels. These factors may include socio-economic conditions of 
various kinds when people are looking to move from places or countries where they are less 
likely to get employment or seeking opportunities to go to other destinations where they 
may be more fortunate.
17 Ahmad Al-Ali Darda, Arab Brain Drain: Causes and Ways of Remedy (Beirut: Al-Manra,  2003),  26.
18 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index  2019 (Berlin: Transparency International,  2020),  18.
19 Attouf, M Y, Brain Drain: The Emigration of Arab Talent to Developed Countries (Beirut: Dar Al-Andalus, 
 1984),  49.
20 David Karemera et al., ‘A gravity model analysis of international migration to North America’,  Applied 
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4. IMPLICATIONS OF ARAB YOUTH MIGRATION
The impacts of migration are various; they affect destination countries and origin countries. 
Both parties are gaining benefits and suffer losses. ‘The countries of immigration obtain 
growth of the economy, increased competition in the labor market, more taxpayers, and 
cheap foreign labor; while countries of emigration obtain remittances, decrease in a rate of 
employment and free labor training.’21 In the following sections, the author will review the 
main benefits and losses of the origin countries, the host countries and the immigrants.
4.1. The implications of migration on the countries of origin
Most Arab countries view migration as an inevitable solution to unemployment.22 As such, 
many Arab governments contracted bilateral agreements with some other countries to 
organise and regulate Arab labour migration to these countries. Additionally, Arab countries 
have worked through the League of Arab States to establish mechanisms of cooperation 
and partnership with other regions and groups, such as ‘the African–Arab summit, the 
summit of American–Arab countries, and the European Union Arab league foreign affairs 
ministerial meetings’.23 The effects of migration on development and well-being in Arab 
countries are still the subject of debate among researchers as it entails benefits and losses 
for these countries. One negative implication of the Arab youth migration is the depletion 
of highly educated human resources from the MENA region. Generally speaking, Arab 
countries are suffering from the loss of their newly qualified medical doctors, engineers 
and scientists each year, many of them move to the European Union, the United States and 
Canada. According to the Arab League and the Arab Labour Organization statistics, ‘the 
Arab world takes up about  31% of the brain drain from developing countries; about  50% 
of doctors,  23% of engineers and  15% of the scientists of the total Arab talent migrated 
to Europe and the United States and Canada’.24 For example, in ‘the United Kingdom the 
percentage of Arab doctors of the total physicians working there is  34%’.25 At the same time, 
’the number of highly-skilled-born Arab residents in the OECD countries, particularly 
the European Union, was more than one million; about half of them came from the Arab 
Maghreb countries’.26
These statistics and data indicate the extent of the losses incurred by the Arab states as 
a result of youth migration, especially highly skilled migrants. The losses involve not only 
21 Yuriy Kozak and Temur Shengelia, International Economic Relations (Tbilisi: Universal,  2014),  97–98.
22 Farris Albeel, Energy drain. Paper presented at the Youth Immigration Seminar (Tunisia,  2012),  9.
23 Enas El-Fergany, ‘Regional cooperation in international migration: The case of the Arab Region’, The Journal of 
Migration Policy Practice  5, no  3 (2015),  7.
24 Ibrahim Qwaider, The loss of talent for the benefit of other countries, to stop Arab brain drain,  2004,  6.
25 Aida Ezzat, Arab Brain Drain (Egyptian Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade,  2008),  6.
26 Myson Fogo, Human Development Strategies and their Role in Alleviating the Scientific Brain Drain Phenomenon 
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the financial cost of education and training of Arab emigrant’s youth, but it includes also 
losses of minds and skills that could otherwise contribute to the development processes 
in these countries. On the other hand, most Arab countries have dealt with migration as 
a solution to economic and social challenges such as unemployment and poverty. As such 
remittances have been viewed by the Arab Government as one of the revenues of the Arab 
economy. Remittances represent one of the main benefits received by the Arab countries. It 
covers the expenses of household, healthcare and may create incentives for more investment 
in academic education and vocational training. Actually, ‘the ratio of remittances to the 
GDP in the Arab region was  2.2%’.27 Figure  1 shows the remittances inflows and the ratio 
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Figure  1 • Remittances inflow and the ratio of remittances to GDP in some Arab countries 
 2017 (Source: World Bank Group,  2018,  31.)
The figure above shows that Egypt was the largest recipient of remittances in the Middle 
East and North Africa region in  2017 ($20 billion), followed by Lebanon ($8 billion) and 
Morocco ($7.5 billion). While Palestine (West Bank and the Gaza Strip) was the highest 
in terms of remittances to GDP percentage (15.3 per cent) followed by Lebanon (15.1 per 
cent) and Yemen (13.1 per cent). However, it is interesting to note that in Arab countries, 
remittances are generally used to cover the cost of household expenses and healthcare. 
This means that remittances correlate more closely with private consumption than with 
investment purposes in the Arab context. Table  1 shows the purposes of spending in some 
Arab countries.
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Table  1 • The purposes of spending remittances in some Arab countries, % 







of a company Investments Other
Algeria 45 13 23 3 5 11
Egypt 43 12 18 0 15 12
Jordan 74 16 4 0 6 0
Lebanon 46 24 5 08 5 5
Morocco 56 31 16 0 5 2
Tunisia 0 23 34 2 16 25
Syria 61 11 8 0 0 20
As the above table shows, among the Arab countries, the best country in utilising and 
investing these remittances is Tunisia (16 per cent) followed by Egypt (15 per cent), while 
this ratio was only  5 per cent in Algeria, Morocco and Lebanon, and  0 in Syria due to the 
permanence of conflict and political instability.
4.2. The implications of migration on the host countries
Managing migratory issues with the MENA region is one of the main components of the 
agenda of the European Union. The EU has promoted initiatives and agreements with 
some Arab countries on different levels. These initiatives include, but are not limited to 
‘regional dialogues like the Khartoum Process in  2014, bilateral dialogues on migration, 
mobility and security with Morocco and Tunisia in  2011, and more recently with Lebanon 
in  2014 and important bilateral agreements, such as the two Mobility Partnerships signed 
with Morocco in  2011 and with Tunisia in  2014’.29 The aims of these various approaches 
and initiatives are to foster cooperation on migratory issues, mitigate the negative impacts 
of migration, and make it less permanent and more mutually beneficial. The Barcelona 
Process which was launched in  1995 with the aim of strengthening the Mediterranean 
partnership primarily tackles three principles: the reduction of migratory pressures 
through job creation; the fight against illegal migration; and the protection of the rights of 
legal migrants.30 The continuity of Arab youth migration to other host countries such as 
European countries brings both benefits and losses to the host countries as well as to the 
immigrant himself. Utilising cheap migrant labour, the host countries decrease the cost of 
production and increase the competitiveness of their products in the international labour 
28 The information is collected and translated from the original Table  3.1,  137.
29 Sánchez-Montijano and Girona-Raventós, ‘Arab Mediterranean Youth Migration’,  4–5.
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market. Moreover, ‘the host country wins at the expense of the taxes which size depends on 
qualifying and age structure of immigrants’.31
Although European Union institutions have recognised the benefits of realistic and 
proactive migration policies, they also know that these will only be successful if coupled 
with the socio-economic, civic and political inclusion of migrants.32 The integration of 
Arabs into European societies is one of the most important challenges for the European 
Union. Overcoming the disagreement between the need for highly skilled young 
immigrants and low-cost labour to maximise profit from migration and the fear of losing 
the distinct identity and the diversity of the culture and values is one of the main challenges 
the European governments have to face. It is not easy to provide a clear depiction of the 
reality of the integration of Arab youth into European societies, due to the difference in 
the policies of European countries towards the integration process. For example, from 
the European point of view, the integration is based on the immigrant’s acceptance of 
European laws, principles, norms and values.33 On the other hand, ‘from Islamic and Arab 
perspectives, this process should depend on the inclusion of immigrants into European 
societies on the basis of citizenship and social & political contract’.34 Integration is not an 
easy process, it needs reciprocal cooperation from all sides, and it should be developed 
gradually and continuously in order to be succeeded. Actually, integration is a  two-way 
process; ‘it requires adaptation on the part of the newcomer but also successful integration 
can only take place if the host society provides access to jobs and services, and acceptance 
of the immigrants in social interaction’.35
4.3. The impact of migration on Arab youth immigrants
Living in western societies allowed Arab youth to benefit from the different characteristics 
of those societies, as well as trying their best to adapt to the western lifestyle of western 
countries. For example, many Arab youth residing in western countries choose to marry 
a western citizen of those countries and start a  family, which facilitates their interactions 
with the new social context and broadens their integration into the host societies. Integration 
in terms of work, language, and gaining the values and cultures of societies is crucial to 
the success of immigrants in their new lives. With regards to the impact on skills and 
knowledge of Arab youth immigrants, it is not surprising that immigration to developed 
31 Kozak and Shengelia, International Economic Relations,  98.
32 Anja Rudiger and Sarah Spencer, The Economic and Social Aspects of Migration: Social Integration of Migrants 
and Ethnic Minorities. Conference Jointly Organised by the European Commission and the OECD, Brussels, 
 21–22 January  2003.
33 Christian Joppke, ‘Beyond National Models. Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe’, West 
European Politics 30, no  1 (2007),  3.
34 Ali Awad, Integration of Muslims in European Societies through Two Visions,  2014.
35 Stephen Castles et al., Integration: Mapping the Field. Report of a  Project carried out by the University of 
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and scientifically advanced countries increases access to opportunities that will subsequently 
benefit immigrants and the country of origin. Undoubtedly, ‘the migrant who gets the 
opportunity to work in the same area of his or her educational qualification and training is 
more likely to engage with knowledge transfer or development programs back home’.36
The training and experience Arab youth immigrants receive and gain in their host 
countries are greatly superior to what they can do for their countries of origin in case 
they choose to return home. It is important to note that the acquisition of skills and 
experience is less likely to occur in the absence of an incubator that provides individuals 
with opportunities to work and practice in areas that allow them to utilise what they have 
learned. Hence, it is very important to integrate immigrants, especially in learning the 
language of the host country, in order to facilitate their access to more opportunities.
Nevertheless, the idea of immigration remains a difficult decision, as it involves some 
difficulties and is fraught with uncertainty and risks. The Arab youth who choose the 
so-called irregular immigration put their lives at risk, as this type of migration is facilitated 
and organised by networks of smugglers who often use high-risk routes. The International 
Organization for Migration recorded ‘5,098 deaths by people making Mediterranean 
crossing in  2016 on top of the  3,784 people reported dead or missing in  2015.  Between 
 1  January  2017 and  6 March  2017 there are further  521 recorded deaths’.37 In addition, 
finding a job in the host country is not a flower-paved road. The jobs that young migrants 
may get or be offered, depend mainly on his/her skills and educational qualification, 
sometimes the immigrants’ endeavours to find jobs that commensurate with their skills 
are not an easy task. Furthermore, data revealed that immigrants are still among the least 
fortunate groups in host communities. ‘Migrants are often the first to lose their jobs in 
the event of an economic downturn. Some work for less pay, and in worse conditions 
than native-born workers. Some migrants endure human rights violations, abuse, and 
discrimination.’38 Nevertheless, in order to reduce the risks and costs of migrations, ‘most 
youth migrants prefer to move to areas where members of their network already reside’.39
To sum up, the disparity in the political and economic environments between the MENA 
region and Europe, including the distribution of capital and labour, pushes Arab youth to 
migrate from Arab countries to European countries. Interestingly, the impacts of youth 
migration affect both the home country and the host country; in addition to the benefits 
gained by migrants. Despite the adverse impacts of Arab human migration, it has had 
a  reasonable impact on the Arab countries, where benefits include sending remittances 
and transferring knowledge and best practices to their home country. On the other hand, 
36 Sheila Siar, ‘Diaspora Knowledge Transfer as a  Development Strategy for Capturing the Gains of Skilled 
Migration’, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 23, no  3 (2014),  307.
37 Andrew Geddes and Leila Hadj-Abdou, ‘Changing the Path? EU Migration Governance after the ‘Arab 
Spring’,’ Mediterranean Politics 23, no  1 (2018),  143.
38 United Nations, International Migration Report (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs,  2017),  1.
39 United Nations, World Youth Report: Youth and Migration (New York: United Nations, Department of 









PRO PU BL IC O B ON O – M AG YA R KÖZ IG A Z G ATÁ S •  2 0 2 0 /4 .
host countries get cheap labour and highly skilled immigrants who can contribute to the 
development and scientific research in these countries. Certainly, immigrants can also 
reap benefits from their mobility to other countries, such as financial returns and the 
acquisition of skills and experience.
5. CONCLUSION
Migration is an international phenomenon that affects mostly developing countries, 
including the Arab countries. The accumulation of capital and opportunities in developed 
and more developed countries accelerate the movement of the labour of particularly 
educated youth to these countries; as a result, the Arab countries become vulnerable to the 
depletion of highly educated people. Migration from the Arab countries continued because 
of the effect of several factors. These factors include, but are not limited to, economic 
stagnation, unemployment, corruption and favoritism, and political instability. Estimates 
indicate that the increase in the unemployment rate over time and the continuing gap 
between the population growth rates and economic growth will increase the expulsion 
factors, and push additional numbers of Arab labour to migrate. Concerning the socio-
political context, the political conflicts and civil war are still afflicting many Arab countries 
such as Syria, Lybia and Yemen. This created difficult economic and living conditions in 
these countries and contributed to raising the levels of emigration among Arab youth 
from these unstable countries. The main detrimental effect of immigration was the loss of 
scientists and experts resulting in a permanent need for skills especially in certain fields 
such as medicine and physics.
Despite the negative effects of youth emigration from the Arab countries, because 
of the loss of scientists and experts, Arab countries also benefitted from migration. 
Remittances are one of the main benefits, but unfortunately, most of them are used for 
personal consumption instead of investment or entrepreneurial projects. The redirection 
of remittances towards investment rather than consumption is likely to contribute to 
improving the labour market in Arab countries; this will positively affect the welfare of 
the citizen. The Arab governments, therefore, must adopt creative policies to maintain 
their pool of young talent and decrease the rate of migration of youth and highly skilled 
people. From a development point of view, strengthening the relationship with Diasporas 
and supporting their initiatives towards their home countries is a key policy that must be 
adopted by the Arab governments. These initiatives may include economic investments 
and knowledge transfer. Finally, improving the Arab institutions’ potentials to absorb and 
utilise the experiences of repatriates and highly skilled migrants necessitates the creation 
of evidence-based policies; and also the improvement of the level of coordination and 
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